2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

SPARKS, TEHAN & RYLEY, P.C. **ATTORNEYS** 

7503 FIRST STREET SCOTTSDALE, ARIZONA 85251 TELEPHONE 480-949-1339

Joe P. Sparks, Attorney I.D. No. 2383 John H. Ryley, Attorney I.D. No. 2095 Susan B. Montgomery, Attorney I.D. No. 20595 Attorneys for San Carlos Apache



BEFORE THE ARIZONA NAVIGABLE STREAM

ADJUDICATION COMMISSION

In re Determination of Navigability of the Gila River

No. 03-007-NAV

10 11

12

13

14

15 16

17

18

19

20

21 22

23

24

25

26 27

OPENING POST-HEARING MEMORANDUM OF THE SAN CARLOS APACHE TRIBE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE GILA RIVER WAS NAVIGABLE AT THE TIME OF ARIZONA'S STATEHOOD

The Arizona Navigable Stream Adjudication Commission (the Commission) held a hearing on November 16 and 17, 2005, in Phoenix, Arizona, to determine whether the Gila River was navigable as of February 14, 1912, the date of Arizona's statehood, pursuant to the federal test to determine "navigability for title" under the equal footing doctrine.

The San Carlos Apache Tribe ("Apache Tribe" or "Tribe"), submits its Opening Memorandum, and respectfully requests that the Commission determine that the Gila River is non-navigable for the reasons stated below.

Α. The Legal Test Under the Federal Test to Determine "Navigability for Title" Under the Equal Footing Doctrine

To determine "navigability for the title of the Gila River", the Commission should apply a three part federal test: (1)"Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are used, as highways for

commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on waters." [Emphasis added]. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870)<sup>1</sup>; (2) It must have been navigable "in its natural and ordinary conditions". Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1922)<sup>2</sup> [Emphasis added]; and (3) at the time of Statehood. <sup>3</sup>

These criterial will be discussed in order below.

## 1. Navigable In Fact When Used As Highways For Trade and Travel

The federal test for navigability was first set forth in the case of *The Daniel Ball*, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870):

Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water. [Emphasis added].

The *Daniel Ball* test requires that a river was used, or was "susceptible" of being used, as a "highway for commerce," because the *Daniel Ball* navigability test was developed based upon the assertion of federal jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Article I, § 8, to regulate interstate commerce.

In *The Montello*, 87 U.S. 430 (1874), another case testing Congress' power to regulate under the Commerce Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court further elaborated on the *Daniel Ball* test to determine "navigability":

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>The Tribe will submit a separate brief on the requirement of "commerce" and its meaning on February 27, 2006 pursuant to ANSAC Information Update, January 31, 2006.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>While the evidence relating to the part of the river in the eastern half of the State is not so conclusive against navigability as that relating to the western section, we think it establishes that trade and travel neither do nor can move over that part of the river, in its natural and ordinary condition....Its characteristics are such that its use for transportation has been and must be exceptional, and confined to the irregular and short periods of temporary high water. A greater capacity for practical and beneficial use in commerce is essential to establish navigability. [Emphasis added]. *Id.*at 591.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926); United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75, 83 (1931); State of Oregon v. Riverfront Protection Association, 672 F.2d 792, 795 (9th Cir. 1982); Land Department v. O'Toole, 154 Ariz. 43, 44, 739 P.2d 1360, 1361 (App. 1987) ("The federal Equal Footing Doctrine grants each state property rights to the riverbeds of all its waterways which were navigable on the date of statehood"); Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest v. Hassell, 172 Ariz. 356, 837 P.2d 158, 165 (App. 1991); and Defenders of Wildlife v. Hull, 199 Ariz. 411, 18 P.3d 722 (App. 2001).

The capability of use by the public for purposes of transportation and commerce affords the true criterion of the navigability of a river, rather than the extent and manner of that use. If it be capable in its natural state of being used for commerce, no matter in what mode the commerce may be conducted, it is navigable in fact, and becomes in law a public river or highway. [Emphasis added].

Id. at 441.

The court in *The Montello*, quoting a Massachusetts Supreme Court opinion, *Rowe v. The Granite Bridge Corporation*, 38 Mass. (21 Pickering at 344) 344, 347 (Mass. 1838), stated that "It is not...every small creek in which a fishing skiff or gunning canoe can be made to float at high water which is deemed navigable, but, in order to give it the character of a navigable stream, it must be generally and commonly useful to some purpose of trade or agriculture." [Emphasis added]. *Id.* at 442. The *Montello* court further explained that "...the vital and essential point is whether the natural navigation of the river is such that it affords a useful commerce. If this be so the river is navigable in fact, although its navigation may be encompassed with difficulties by reason of natural barriers, such as rapids and sandbars." [Emphasis added]. *Id.* at 443. Both *The Daniel Ball* and *The Montello* cases therefore require a "highway for commerce," or "useful commerce," as part of the navigability test.

All of the U.S. Supreme Court cases and lower federal court cases, including the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying and following the *Daniel Ball* and the *Montello* tests to determine "navigability for title" under the equal footing doctrine, have required commercial use in fact, or susceptibility for commercial use, at the time of statehood.

In *United States v. Oregon*, 295 U.S. 1 (1935), the Supreme Court held that three lakes in Oregon were non-navigable because "The Special Master found that the boating which took place in the area involved had no commercial aspects..." The Supreme Court in *Oregon* squarely held that non-commercial private recreational boating for the purposes of trapping and duck hunting in the spring and fall was insufficient to establish navigability for title purposes ("The boats were all of light draft, those most in use being canvas canoes or homemade rowboats drawing between one and six inches of water."). *Id.* at 21.

The Supreme Court in *Oregon* held that these facts "...establish an absence of that capacity for general and common usefulness for purposes of trade and commerce which is

2 3 4

<sup>4</sup>United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Company, 174 U.S. 690 (1899). <sup>5</sup>Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1922).

essential to navigability," and that "[a]t most the evidence shows such an occasional use of boats, sporadic and ineffective, as has been observed on lakes, streams, or ponds large enough to float a boat, but which nevertheless were held to lack navigable capacity," citing *The Montello, Rio Grande Dam,* and Oklahoma v. Texas cases as controlling federal law. Id. at 23.

Similarly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled in several cases that commerce is an essential requirement for the "navigability for title" test. For example, in *Ahtna*, the lower 30 mile stretch of the Gulkana River in Alaska was at issue. The flow of the river in this stretch was 3,600 to 4,800 c.f.s. from May to September, and an average of three feet deep. Commercial recreational craft including aluminum powerboats and inflatable rafts were used since the 1970's for guided fishing and sightseeing trips, and the Ninth Circuit observed "A substantial industry of such **transportation for profit** emerged in the lower Gulkana, which industry today employs 400 people." [Emphasis added]. *Id.* at 1405. The court held in *Ahtna* that "[u]nder the facts of this case, we think the present use of the lower Gulkana is **commercial** and provides conclusive evidence of the lower Gulkana's **susceptibility for commercial use at statehood**. [Emphasis added]. *Id. Ahtna* held that commercial use is a required element of the federal criteria to determine navigability under the equal footing doctrine.

In Adams v. The Montana Power Company, 528 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1975), the Ninth Circuit similarly held that commerce under the Daniel Ball test requires commercial activity and commercial craft, and that non-commercial recreational boating use by fisherman, water skiers, or pleasure boaters, cannot satisfy the commerce requirement under the Daniel Ball test. The Ninth Circuit observed that for admiralty jurisdiction "[n]either non-commercial fishing nor pleasure boating nor water skiing constitutes commerce." [Emphasis added]. Id. at 438.

A finding of navigability under the equal footing doctrine therefore requires sustained

 beneficial commercial use. Non-commercial recreational boating, such as, for example, canoeing, rafting, or kayaking, for personal pleasure, cannot satisfy the commercial navigability requirement under the *Daniel Ball* test.

# 2. There Must Be Evidence of Commercial Navigability or Susceptibility for Commercial Navigability Under "Natural and Ordinary Conditions"

In *United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Company*, 174 U.S. 690 (1899), another Commerce Clause case, the Supreme Court held that "...the mere fact that logs, poles and rafts are floated down a stream occasionally and in times of high water does not make it a navigable river," citing and relying on *The Montello* case. *Id.* at 698. The court also stated that "[its] use for any purposes of transportation has been and is exceptional, and only in times of temporary high water. **The ordinary flow is insufficient**." [Emphasis added]. *Id.* at 699.

Thus, under the federal test for navigability for title determinations under the equal footing doctrine, commercial navigation is required, and it must take place during the "ordinary flow" or "ordinary condition" of a river, and not just during times of "high flows."

In Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1922), the Supreme Court determined that the Red River in Oklahoma was non-navigable under the equal footing doctrine, applying the Daniel Ball, and Montello federal cases and standards to determine navigability. Oklahoma v. Texas is a very significant case for navigability determinations in Arizona because the facts reported in the case regarding the Red River are very similar to the conditions of most rivers in Arizona, including the Gila River.

The Supreme Court in Oklahoma explained that in the stretch of the Red River in the western half of the state, the Red River gauge at Denison ranged between zero and 1 foot, and that there were only 42 days during the year 1910 (Oklahoma was admitted as a state in 1907) on which this gauge read 2 feet or over, and only 81 days on which it read 1 foot or over, and that an examination of the river from a flat bottom bateau drawing 5 and ½ inches of water when loaded was very difficult because of sand bars. The Supreme Court then held, based on this evidence that:

We regard it as obvious that in the western half of the State the river is not susceptible of being used in its natural and ordinary

condition as a highway for commerce; and there is no evidence that in fact it ever was so used. [Emphasis added].

Id. at 588.

The Supreme Court then reviewed the conditions of the Red River in Oklahoma in the eastern part of the state where the Red River receives additional waters from the Washita and other tributaries and "has a practically continuous flow of varying volume, the extreme variation between high and low water being about thirty feet." *Id.* at 589. The Court held that the Red River was non-navigable in the eastern stretch as well, based upon the following evidence:

At all times there is an almost continuous succession of shifting and extensive sand bars. Ordinarily the depth of water over the sand bars is from six to eighteen inches and elsewhere from three to six feet. There is no permanent or stable channel. Such as there is shifts irregularly from one side of the bed to the other and not infrequently separates into two or three parts. Boats with a sufficient draft to be of any service can ascend and descend only during periods of high water. These periods are intermittent, or irregular and short duration, and confined to a few months in the year. [Oklahoma at p. 589]. [Emphasis added].

The Supreme Court also recognized that near the eastern Oklahoma boundary before railroads were extended into that section, there had been boats of light draft carrying merchandise in that vicinity of the Red River, but only in periods of high water and then with some difficulty. The Supreme Court then held that the eastern stretch of the Red River was non-navigable as well:

Thus, the commercial navigability of the Gila River must be determined under its "natural and ordinary condition" at the time of statehood, and not during temporary periods of high water flows.

While the criteria under the federal Daniel Ball test adopted under the Commerce Clause,6

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>The Commerce Clause, Article I, Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution, provides in part that Congress shall have the power "To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." The holdings of the Supreme Court in *The Daniel Ball*, 77 U.S. 557 (1870); *The Montello*, 87 U.S. 430 (1874); and *United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Company*, 174 U.S. 690 (1899), were based on the constitutional power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause. All of the U.S. Supreme Court "navigability for title" cases were decided thereafter, but adopted the *Daniel Ball* federal criteria in general to determine navigability under the equal footing doctrine, except that navigability of a river must also be determined at the time of statehood

in general apply to "navigability for title" determinations, the criteria are also different because of the addition requirement under the "equal footing" doctrine be determined as of the date that a state is admitted to the Union. This restriction in time does not apply to navigability determinations made under the Commerce Clause exclusively to regulate interstate commerce.

# 3. Navigability at the Time of Statehood Under "Equal Footing"

## a. Burden of Proof

The proponents of navigability have the burden of proof to establish that the Gila River is navigable under the equal footing doctrine.<sup>7</sup>

"Equal footing" among states is not expressly stated in the United States Constitution. In fact, efforts to expressly require equality were deleted in the draft Constitution by a vote of nine (9) to two (2) states. M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Constitution of 1878 (New Haven; rev. ed. (1937)), 454, 455.

The equal footing doctrine is based on the English common law that the English Crown held sovereign title to all lands underlying navigable waters. The thirteen original states succeeded to the title of such submerged lands within their boundaries, as the sovereign successors to the English Crown, prior to the adoption of the U.S. Constitution. See Martin v. Waddells' Lessee, 41 U.S. 367 (1842). Subsequently admitted States entered the Union on an "equal footing" with the original thirteen states under federal common law. Therefore, most states are found to hold title to land under navigable waters within their boundaries at the time of their entry into the Union. See Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845).

The equal footing doctrine is not based upon the Commerce Clause. If a river is navigable at the time of statehood, title to the "banks and beds" of navigable streams is usually found to have vested in a state at the time it is admitted to the Union. Thereafter, questions of the state's title to the underlying lands are generally controlled by each state's law, not federal common law. See Oregon v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977), overruling Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973).

under the equal footing doctrine.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>See Hassell, 156 Ariz. at 363, fn.10, and A.R.S. § 37-1128(A).

The federal government can under the Property Clause to the U.S. Constitution,<sup>8</sup> however, defeat a prospective state's title to land under navigable waters at the time it is admitted to the Union, by a pre-statehood conveyance to a private party, or by a pre-statehood express reservation of such land by Congress which clearly and expressly defeats a prospective state's title to such land. See Utah Division of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 201 (1987).

The proponents of navigability have the burden of proof to establish that the Gila River is navigable under the equal footing doctrine.

In State of Oregon v. Riverfront Protection Association, 672 F.2d 792, 795 (9th Cir. 1982), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the federal criteria to determine navigability under the Commerce Clause, substantially differs from the federal criteria to determine navigability under the equal footing doctrine:

Navigability for title to riverbeds differs in three important respects from navigability for federal regulatory jurisdiction over power plants under the Commerce Clause. The former must exist at the time the State is admitted into the Union. Also, it must exist in the river's ordinary condition, see United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75-76, 51 S. Ct. 438, 440-41, 75 L. Ed. 844 (1931); it cannot occur as a result of reasonable improvements. This is not the case in federal power plant licensing. See United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 61 S. Ct. 291, 85 L. Ed. 243 (1940). [Emphasis added].

The Commerce Clause gives the federal government a "dominant servitude" to regulate interstate navigable waters, even where states have already taken title to lands underlying such navigable rivers under the equal footing doctrine. See United States v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, 480 U.S. 700 (1987).

In fact, in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979), the Supreme Court described the plenary power of Congress to regulate its waters under the Commerce Clause, as broadly described in Appalachian Electric, as not limited to control for navigation, and not dependent on a river's "navigability," as follows:

Appalachian Power Co. indicates that congressional authority over the waters of this Nation does not depend on a stream's

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>The Property Clause to the U.S. Constitution provides that "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States...." U.S. Constitution, Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.

"navigability." \*\*\*\* The cases that discuss Congress' paramount authority to regulate waters used in interstate commerce are consequently best understood when viewed in terms of more traditional Commerce Clause analysis than by reference to whether the stream in fact is capable of supporting navigation or may be characterized as "navigable waters of the United States." [Emphasis added].

"Navigability for title" cases are therefore not governed by the plenary power of Congress under the Commerce Clause to regulate interstate commerce, and must therefore be clearly distinguished from Commerce Clause cases.

Under the equal footing doctrine, the navigability of a river must therefore be determined based upon its existing condition at the time of statehood, and not based upon its condition under pre-development virgin conditions prior to statehood, as argued by proponents.

In *Defenders of Wildlife v. Hull*, 199 Ariz. 411, 418, 18 P.3d 722, 729 (2001), the court warned that "A federal determination of 'navigability' may serve many different purposes, the three most typical being: to confer admiralty jurisdiction, to define Congress' reach under the commerce power, and to grant title under the equal footing doctrine."

The *Hull* court expressed its warning to differentiate these three different types of cases in which a determination of navigability is required, as follows:

Because of the variant circumstances in which navigability is raised, the cases interpreting navigability "cannot be 'simply lumped into one basket." \*\*\*\* Indeed, when discussing navigability, any reliance on judicial precedent should be predicated on a careful appraisal of the purpose for which the concept of navigability is invoked. \*\*\*\* For the present purpose, navigability is being used to determine the extent of land the State of Arizona received by virtue of the equal footing doctrine. [18 P.3d at 729].

The *Hull* court was absolutely correct in distinguishing the "variant circumstances in which navigability is raised," and "the purpose for which the concept of navigability is invoked."

### b. Evidence

The "evidence" before the Commission regarding the navigability of the Gila River covered the entire reach of the Gila River from the eastern border of Arizona to its confluence

with the Colorado River.9

The "ordinary condition" is best represented hydrologically by the median flow, not the average flow of the Gila River. *See* testimony of Allen Gookin "You've got to look at the median flows to get anything resembling a typical flow." TR 16:230.

There is no Historical Evidence of Commercial Navigation of the Gila Prior to or at the Time of Statehood before the Commission.

At the November 16, 2005 hearing, Dennis Gilpin, testified on behalf of the Arizona State Land Department regarding evidence of historical boating on the Gila River. He testified that there were nine accounts of boating identified along the entire Gila River between 1846 and the time of statehood, a period of 68 years. TR at 16:37. None can be described as beneficially fulfilling any commercial purpose, most are exploratory and recreational in nature, and only a few might be described as successful.

The first recorded attempt to boat the Gila River was by the Mormon Battalion in 1846 to float some of their supplies down the Gila River starting at about 70 miles above the mouth of the Gila River. The raft went aground and they were forced to leave their supplies. TR at 16:38. Mr. Gilpin testified that "It was not a successful experience." TR at 16:38. There is an anecdotal report next in 1849 that the Edward Howard party floated down the Gila River from Gila Bend to Yuma. No other details are available. Then in 1850, there is an unsigned letter to the New York Tribune reporting that some '49rs had successfully floated some supplies down the Gila River. There are not any other contemporaneous reports documenting this practice, however, during this period of time. There are then no other reports of any other boating on the Gila River for a period of 17 years.

In 1867, there is then a report concerning the use of a ferry to cross the Gila River near Maricopa Wells which was used 25 years, but it is unknown whether the ferry was used under

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>Two separate statutory reports were prepared on behalf of the Arizona State Land Department, the "Arizona Stream Navigability Study for the Gila River: Colorado River Confluence to the Town of Safford," as revised June 2003; and the "Arizona Stream Navigability Study for the Gila River: Safford to the State Boundary," as revised June 2003, by JE Fuller Hydrology & Geomorphology, referred to respectively herein as "ASLD Study 1," the lower Gila River; and "ASLD Study 2," the upper Gila River, admitted as E-4 and E-2 (Evidence Log).

"ordinary conditions," or only just during "high flows" of the Gila River to cross the river.

In North Dakota v. United States, 972 F.2d 235, 239 (8th Cir. 1992), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected evidence of the use of ferries to cross the Little Missouri River to demonstrate navigability under the equal footing doctrine, holding that:

The ferries functioned much like bridges where funds were not available to construct traditional bridges. The ferries were used only to provide transportation across the River; they were not used for transportation up or down the River. [6] [Emphasis added].

There are no other reports of boating on the Gila River until the 1880's when there were a handful of exploratory or recreational boating trips reported, the most famous being the William "Buckey" O'Neill trip from Phoenix to Yuma in 1881, in a boat named "Yuma or Bust." The Phoenix Gazette reported that the three men had to wade in the water most of the time and push the boat ahead of them. In 1881, two men, Cotton and Bingham, were reported to be planning to take a boat trip to Yuma, but as Mr. Gilpin testified, "We really don't know whether that was successful or not." TR 16:40.

There is then a report in 1895 in the *Arizona Sentinel* of two persons named Evans and Adams who boated the Gila River in January and February of 1895 from Clifton to Sacaton, then transported the boat overland on a train to Phoenix, and boated from there to Yuma. Evans reported that "I would not engage to make the trip down [the Gila's] hazardous waters again." ASLD Study 1 at p. IV-8, E-4. Their boat had to be lowered through rapids and boulders and was damaged, and had to be repaired. Jon Fuller testified that this occurred just below San Carlos<sup>11</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>While there are several other reports of ferries used to cross the Gila River prior to statehood, they are not reviewed herein, because it is unknown if such ferry use only occurred during "high flows," or under "ordinary conditions." TR 16:72. In addition, evidence of use of ferries to cross a river functioning like a bridge does not satisfy the federal criteria to establish navigability. North Dakota v. United States, 972 F.2d 235, 239 (8th Cir. 1992). In 1889, when there was an attempt for the first reported time to navigate a ferry down the Gila River from the Maricopa Wells Fair to Gila Bend, the ferry hit a snag and broke in half. TR 16:40. There are no other reports of ferries being used for upstream or downstream commercial use prior to statehood, although they were widely used on the Colorado River prior to statehood in that stretch determined to be navigable in Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>San Carlos as described here is the old town of San Carlos located on the San Carlos Apache Reservation next to the Gila River. San Carlos was totally inundated after Coolidge Dam was completed in 1928, and was relocated next to the San Carlos River about ten miles north of the Gila River.

when they went through the canyon there, and "actually, I think, broke the front half of their boat off and had to line the boat through." TR 16:74. See Evan and Adams report describing the boat wreck near San Carlos, ASLD Study 2, E-2 at p. 3-28. Mr. Gilpin describes all of the reported boating trips in the 1880's as "recreational attempts at boating the Gila River." TR16:39.

Mr. Gilpin testified that in 1889 there was a ferry boat launched far below the Apache Reservation at the Maricopa Wells Fair that was boated down to Gila Bend to be used as a ferry there, but "that it hit a snag and broke in half." TR16:40.

There are only a handful of other anecdotal reports of boating attempts between 1889 and the time of statehood. In 1905, there are three reported unsuccessful attempts to boat the Gila River. ASLD Study 1 at IV–13 (E-4), and one boat actually capsized and lost its cargo. The last reported boat trip is in 1909 when a canoe trip was taken by Stanley Sykes down the Gila River, but it is unknown what time of year the trip was taken, or what the condition of the Gila River was then. TR16:77.

There is also no evidence that any Native American Indians from either the San Carlos Apache Tribe or Gila River Indian Community ever used the Gila River prior to statehood for any kind of boating or canoeing, even though the Gila River runs through the San Carlos Apache Reservation and Gila River Indian Reservation. TR16:47; 16:67; and 16:247. There is also no evidence that any trappers boated the Gila River in the 1880's. TR16:69.

Thus, the sparse anecdotal boating evidence on the Gila River reviewed above does not establish that there was <u>any</u> successful commercial boating on the Gila River prior to or at the time of Arizona's statehood. In addition, almost all of the exploratory or recreational boating trips reported were unsuccessful. It is also unknown whether these boating trips were taken under "ordinary conditions," or just during "high flows."

There are only two reported boating trips on the Gila River that could have passed through the San Carlos Apache Reservation prior to statehood. The 1895 Evans and Adams trip where their boat broke in half in the rapids and boulders just below San Carlos, and the 1905 Stanley Sykes canoe trip, reviewed above. This historic boating evidence is therefore woefully inadequate to prove by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Gila River was commercially navigable

under the equal footing doctrine, on any reach of the Gila River, especially the stretch running through the San Carlos Apache Reservation, prior to or at the time of statehood.

Douglas R. Littlefield, Ph.D., an expert and highly credible historian submitted an extensive report dated November 3, 2005 (E-12)<sup>12</sup> on the question of the navigability of the Gila River prior to and at the time of Arizona's statehood. He also testified at the hearing. Dr. Littlefield examined thousands of historical documents relating to the navigability of the Gila River prior to and at the time of Arizona's statehood, including federal government surveys and field notes, federal government homestead patents, and historical government records describing the Gila River prior to Arizona's statehood. His report and testimony reflects the fact that the Gila River was always considered and treated by various federal government officials performing their duties, as a non-navigable river, at all times prior to and at the time of Arizona's statehood, as witnessed in the federal government surveys, plats, and field notes;<sup>13</sup> the federal government land patents to individuals that touched or overlayed the Gila River; and in the federal government historical reports and records.

Dr. Littlefield concludes in his report:

From this wealth of information, covering a huge array of documentary sources, only one conclusion can be reached. The Gila River was not navigable or susceptible to navigation on or before February 14, 1912. [E12 at 136].

Dr. Littlefield's exhaustive historical research strongly corroborates the historical boating evidence that the Gila River was non-navigable prior to and at the time of Arizona's statehood.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>Dr. Littlefield's report is entitled, "Assessment of the Navigability of the Gila River Between the Mouth of the Salt River and the Confluence With the Colorado River Prior To and On the Date of Arizona's Statehood, February 14, 1912," dated November 3, 2005.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>The lack of the meandering of the Gila River by U.S. government surveyors while not conclusive or presumptive evidence of the non-navigability of the Gila River, nevertheless, is highly relevant probative evidence of the fact of the non-navigability of the Gila River, since theses federal surveyors were required as part of their duties to meander navigable rivers. See Oklahoma v. State of Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 585 (1922), fn.2, citing Gauthier v. Morrison, 232 U.S. 452 (1914).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>The oral histories contained in ASLD Study 1 also strongly corroborate the fact that there was not any navigation on the Gila River prior to statehood. For example, see 1993 Statement of Daniel Colvin, from Eden, Arizona, located not far upstream from the San Carlos Apache Reservation, "As a boy [prior to statehood], I saw no commercial use of the Gila River between San Jose and Sunnyside." ASLD Study 1 at V-3 (E-4). Also, Mr. Colvin states, "In my

In addition, another well known expert historian, Jack L. August, Ph.D., <sup>15</sup> submitted an expert witness report, also concluding that the Gila River was non-navigable prior to and at the time of Arizona's statehood. His report reviews many of the historical federal government reports which all treated the Gila River as non-navigable at anytime prior to or at the time of statehood. His report also documents the fact based on federal government reports that the Gila River was often subject to massive flooding, and at other times dry in many of its reaches. *See* E-17 at pp. 19-21, for example, citing *The Twelfth Annual Report of the U.S. Geological Survey*, published in 1891. In his report, Dr. August concludes:

The overwhelming evidence suggests that since modern settlement began in Arizona in the mid-nineteenth century, the Gila River was a non-navigable stream. The documentary evidence, daunting in its size and scope—from unpublished and published sources, federal, state, and territorial records, diaries, newspapers, journals, and a variety of other archival sources—is irrefutable. [E17 at pp. 34-35]. [Emphasis added].

Dr. August testified at the hearing that in his opinion, all of these historical reports demonstrate that the Gila River was non-navigable from the border of New Mexico to its confluence with the Colorado River prior to and at the time of statehood. TR16:175.

Thus, all of the historical evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that the Gila River was in fact non-navigable prior to or at the time of Arizona's statehood.

The evidence shows that the hydrological and geomorphic conditions of the Gila River at the time of Statehood precluded commercial navigation. Most of the expert witnesses that testified at the hearing concurred that at the time of Arizona's statehood, the Gila River was non-navigable. Thus, even Hjalmar Hjalmarson, a hydrologist retained by Maricopa County, and a proponent of the navigability of the Gila River, admitted in his testimony that the Gila River was non-navigable at the time of Arizona's statehood. For example, Mr. Hjalmarson was asked whether he had an opinion as to whether the Gila River, at the junction of the Gila River and the

<sup>90</sup> years of living in Eden, I have seen a lot of things, but the use of the Gila River for navigation was not one of them."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>Dr. August is the Executive Director of the Arizona Historical Foundation, Hayden Library, Arizona State University. His report is entitled "The Lower Gila River: A Non-Navigable Stream on February 14, 1912" (E-17).

Salt River, was navigable at the time of Arizona's statehood. Mr. Hjalmarson responded:

No—okay, I think there were some pools and stuff in there so you might be able to go around a little pond, but no, not navigable in the context of what we're talking about. [TR17:327]. [Emphasis added].

The Gila River was clearly non-navigable at the time of statehood. The Anglo-American farmers who arrived in the mid-1880s, built canals along the Gila River and diverted all of the water from the Gila River for farming purposes. Mr. Hjalmarson testified in his deposition taken January 26, 2003, that because of these canals and diversions, the Gila River was dry in the reaches downstream from these diversions:

After about 1860, Anglo diversion started occurring throughout the Gila River waters. So all the flow that you experience in the Gila after about 1860 reflects the effects of these many diversions, Verde, Salt, Gila, so forth. And, yes, so I would expect, under those conditions, to have the Gila dry. And, in fact, in my report I show examples for 1905 where, because of diversions, the Gila, you know, goes dry, it was quite common after those diversions occurred. [E-24 at p. 70.]

Dr. August also testified that the Gila River had been over-appropriated by the time of Arizona's statehood, <sup>16</sup> by Anglo-American farmers who had arrived in the mid-1800s, and started to divert the Gila River for irrigation purposes. <sup>17</sup> Also, *see* Dr. August's expert witness report, E-

- 15 -

1 2

3

4 5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13 14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2122

23

24

25

2627

28

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>See TR16:162, and 16:194-195.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>There were many irrigation canals constructed in the Duncan/Virden and Safford valleys upstream from the San Carlos Apache Reservation in the mid to latter part of the 1800's that diverted all of the water of the Gila River under "ordinary conditions" for irrigation and farming. In ASLD Study 1 (E-4), it is reported that a gaging station was established at the San Carlos/Coolidge Dam site by the U.S. Geological Survey in 1899, and that the average monthly flow of the Gila River at this location prior to statehood was 272 cfs. E-4 at p VI-5. It is also reported that the maximum estimated flow of the Gila River was 150,000 cfs which occurred on November 28, 1905. The median flow is not reported. The "natural and ordinary flow" is therefore badly distorted by the average which include such heavy floods in the Gila River. The median flow would better represent the "ordinary condition" of the Gila River for purposes of the equal footing doctrine, which would be much lower than the average monthly flow reported. The average monthly flow would also have been much lower at the time of statehood, due to the enormous diversions for lands upstream from the Apache Reservation from none prior to 1872 to over 40,000 acres by 1912. See Globe Equity No. 59 Decree, Article V. The ASLD Study 2, E-4 at p. 5-33, Table 22, reports that the long-term median flow statistics for the Upper Gila River from Safford to New Mexico is between 66 cfs and 174 cfs, but that the Gila River is a losing river in the Safford valley because of the large irrigation diversions there. E-4 at p. 5-34. The "ordinary" or median flow of the Gila River through the San Carlos Apache Reservation at the time of statehood was therefore not capable of supporting any commercial navigation.

17, at pp. 21-26, which documents the fact that the waters of the Gila River had been over-appropriated by the time of statehood.<sup>18</sup>

In the Gila River Indian Community's "Presentation to Arizona Stream and Navigability Commission," 19, Mr. Gookin reports that even under virgin conditions, the Gila River was non-by navigable, 20 and that by the time of Arizona's statehood, the Gila River was clearly non-navigable:

Starting shortly after the American Civil War, irrigation development began up and down the Gila River. In 1886, the Florence Canal was built and its diversion caused the river to dry up in certain locations. [E-5 at p. 4]. [Emphasis added].

Stanley A. Schumm, Ph.D, also provided his expert opinion that the geomorphology of the Gila River in 1912 was not conducive to navigability at the time of statehood because the Gila River had developed into a wide-braided river at this time due to flooding in past years. TR 17:17-20, and 17-23. Dr. Schumm concludes in his report that:

The large, long-duration floods, especially those of 1905 and 1906 converted the relatively stable lower Gila River into a braided channel that was wide and shallow and unsuitable for navigation. [E-6 at p. 16].

The proponents of navigability must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Gila River was navigable at the time of statehood under the equal footing, despite the fact that there were man-made changes to the Gila River that diverted all of the water of the Gila River for farming by the time of statehood, which rendered the Gila River clearly non-navigable at that time. The Commerce Clause cases which many consider the navigability of rivers under pre-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>For example, see R.H. Forbes, *Irrigation and Agricultural Practice in Arizona*, University of Arizona Agricultural Experiment Station, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1911), at pp. 32, 46-48, cited in Dr. August's report (E-17 at pp. 25-26), describing the Gila River in 1911 as "a comparatively small and irregular stream, due to its arid watershed and uncertain rainfall, although occasionally it carries enormous floods. Since the appropriation of its upstream waters for irrigation its lower courses (from the confluence of the Salt to the Colorado) are often dry for months in succession....It may be stated summarily that the fluctuations in water supply become more and more extreme from the source to the mouth of the Gila River."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>E-5, prepared by Allen Gookin, a hydrologist for the Gila River Indian Community, dated November 15, 2005.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>Mr. Gookin reports that "In all my studies, I have never seen any indication that the Pima Maricopas used canoes for transport of goods anywhere in their area." E-5 at p. 3.

development virgin conditions do not apply. See Section A(1) herein.

The evidence is overwhelming that the Gila River was non-navigable at the time of Arizona's statehood on February 14, 1912. The Gila River was not susceptible to commercial navigation prior to or at the time of Statehood.

#### C. Conclusion

The Gila River was commercially non-navigable in its "ordinary condition" at the time of Arizona's statehood on February 14, 1912, under the equal footing doctrine.

All of the historical documentary evidence demonstrates that the Gila River was commercially non-navigable prior to and at the time of Arizona's statehood.

There is no credible evidence that the Gila River was "susceptible" to commercial navigation at the time of Arizona's statehood, or at anytime prior to Arizona's statehood.

Recent periodic use of non-commercial recreational boating or rare commercial recreational boating on short stretches of the Gila River at high flows do not satisfy the "commerce" requirement under the equal footing doctrine.

There is not any evidence to show that the stretch of the Gila River running through the San Carlos Apache Reservation was navigable at the time of Arizona's statehood.

The Apache Tribe therefore requests that the Commission determine for all of the above reasons that the Gila River from the Arizona-New Mexico border, to its confluence with the Colorado River, is non-navigable under the equal footing doctrine.

DATED this  $6^{th}$  day of February, 2006.

SPARKS, TEHAN & RYLEY, P.C.

By

Jee P. Sparks John H. Ryley

Susan B. Montgomery Attorneys for Plaintiffs

**ORIGINAL** plus six copies of the foregoing mailed by First Class Mail this 6th day of February, 2006, to:

1 | Arizona Navigable Stream Adjudication Commission 1700 W. Washington, Suite 304 2 l Phoenix, AZ 85007 3 | **COPY** of the foregoing mailed by First Class Mail this 6th day of 4 | February, 2006, to: 5 | Laurie Hachtel, AAG For the Arizona State Land Department 1275 West Washington Phoenix, AZ 85007 7 Mark McGinnis Rebecca Goldberg For the Salt River Project 9 Salmon, Lewis & Weldon 2850 E. Camelback Road 10 Phoenix, AZ 85016 John Helm Sally Worthington 11 Helm & Kyle For Maricopa County 12 1619 E. Guadalupe, Suite One 13 | Tempe, AZ 85283 Bill Staudenmaier Mike Kafka For Phelps Dodge 15 Ryley, Carlock & Applewhite
16 | 1 North Central Avenue, Suite 1200 Phoenix, AZ 85004 17 Joy Herr-Cardillo 18 Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest 2205 E. Speedway Blvd. 19 | Tucson, AZ 85719 20 ll Sandy Bahr ForSierra Club 202 E. McDowell Rd., Suite 277 21 Phoenix, Arizona 85004 22 Julie M. Lemmon 23 Flood Control District of Maricopa County Julie M. Lemmon, Sole Proprietorship 24 930 S. Mill Ave. Tempe, Arizona 85281 25 John T. Hestand 26 ll Gila River Indian Community 5002 N. Maricopa Rd. Box 5090 27 Chandler, Arizona 85226

1 Kristen L. Copeland
For Buckeye Irrigation Company and
Buckeye Water Conservation Drainage
Meyers, Hendricks & Bivens, PA
3003 N. Central Ave., Suite 1200
Bhooning Arigona 85001 Phoenix, Arizona 85001 C. Bradley Woodford, For Paloma Irrigation and Drainage District Moyes Storey 1850 N. Central Ave., Suite 1100 Phoenix, Arizona 85001 By\_( I:\INDIANSCAT\ANSAC\